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Introduction 
One consequence of the hype around globalization and education and debates on 
global political actors such as the World Bank, IMF and WTO—is that there has not 
been sufficient attention paid by education theorists to the development of a rigorous 
set of analytic categories that might enable us to make sense of the profound changes 
which now characterize education in the new millennium. 1  This is not a problem 
confined to education. Writing in the New Left Review, Fredric Jameson observes that 
debates on globalization have tended to be shaped by “…ideological appropriations—
discussions not of the process itself, but of its effects, good or bad: judgements, in 
other words, totalizing in nature; while functional descriptions tend to isolate 
particular elements without relating them to each other.” 2   
 
In this paper we start from the position that little or nothing can be explained in terms 
of the causal powers of globalization; rather we shall be suggesting that globalization 
is the outcome of processes that involve real actors—economic and political—with 
real interests. Following Martin Shaw, we also take the view that globalization does 
not undermine the state but includes the transformation of state forms; “…it is both 
predicated on and produces such transformations.”3 Examining how these processes 
of transformation work, however, requires systematic investigation into the 
organization and strategies of particular actors whose horizons or effects might be 
described as global.4  
 
One subject of globalization—and the focus of this paper—is the growing importance 
and power of the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in promoting the liberalization of 
trade. Of particular interest to us in relation to education is the General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS)—a process begun in 1994 aimed at a multilateral 
agreement over the liberalization of trading in services that emerged with renewed 
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vigor in the Millennium Round in 2000. 5 The major reasons for making the GATS the 
object of investigation here are that (1) it is less well known than other supranational 
organizations which affect national education policies, such as the World Bank, the 
Organisation for Economic and Cooperative Development (OECD) and the United 
Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO); (2) that it 
operates in a quite different manner from those organizations in that it works through 
binding rules, rather than persuasion or leverage; and finally, (3) that it has the 
potential to affect education systems and practices across a greater range of their 
activities than have any of the other supranational organizations we have become used 
to reading about in the comparative education literature.  
 
Space, Scale and Territorialization 
In this paper we want to prose a three-pronged attack on this problem through an 
initial attempt to analyze the potential role and contribution to the orientation and 
control of national education systems that is inherent in the development of the 
GATS. This involves setting out, briefly, three rather abstract sets of concepts being 
developed by a number of globalization theorists around the production of space, 
scale, and its socio-political contestation. We then draw upon these to enable us to 
critically examine current and potential shifts in the activity of the GATS in the 
education area. 6 Each of these sets of concepts has proved effective in analyzing the 
nature and consequences of globalization and its relationships with the national level 
and for that reason we want to deploy them to help us understand better both the 
nature of the shifts that are occurring within national systems of education and quite 
what might be at stake.  
 
 
Fixity and Motion in Space  
The first of these concepts is that of the fixity and motion of capital. This is a key idea  
introduced to debates on globalizing capital and globalization by David Harvey and 
developed further by Neil Brenner.7 Quoting both Karl Marx and Harvey,  Neil 
Brenner describes the two dynamics of fixity and motion, and the tensions between 
the two, in the following way:  
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…on the one hand, in its drive to accumulate surplus value, capital strives  ‘to 
annihilate space through time’ (Marx, 1973: 539)  and therefore to overcome all 
geographical barriers in its circulation process.  Yet, to pursue this continual 
dynamic of deterritorialization and ‘time-space’ compression (Harvey, 1998a), 
capital necessarily depends upon relatively fixed and immobile territorial 
infrastructures, such as urban, regional agglomerations and territorial states. 8 
 
What Brenner is emphasizing here is that for capital to continue accumulating, both 
its perpetual motion and points of fixity are necessary. At its very simplest, what this 
means is that to ensure its constant expansion, capital has to be mobile, seeking out 
new means and places to make profit. However, that profit can only ultimately be 
both generated and realized at and through fixed points. Thus while we are often told 
that the celebrated flow of capital around the world financial system is so great and 
rapid as to escape the possibilities of control by any nation-state, including the most 
powerful, at the same time that flow can only be realized through institutions that are 
relatively fixed—as in, for instance stock exchanges. This is not to say, to anticipate a 
major argument of this paper, that those institutional fixes must, or will, take place at 
a national level or on national territory, though that has typically been the assumption 
until the last ten years or so. Rather, it is to say that they are essential. It is also to 
point out that the points of fixity might be seen as necessary evils from the point of 
view of the motion of capital, whose logic is to minimize any obstacles in its way.   
 
One of the defining characteristics of globalization, the expansion of capital—
especially of financial capital—has accelerated enormously. However, even in these 
circumstances, and even in the case of financial capital, points of fixity are essential. 
This is because (1) capital cannot guarantee the conditions of its own existence, and 
(2) it always has to be institutionally embedded. In other words, capitalist social 
relations must be set in a configuration of social institutions that is supportive of, or at 
least not obstructive to, its continuing expansion. The key point for our argument here 
is that education as a social institution is deeply implicated in both of these elements 
of fixity. In terms of the former, it contributes to the array of means to address 
capital’s need for infra-structural support to enable its continuing accumulation, to 
bringing about the necessary degree of social order for that accumulation to proceed, 
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and to providing the system as a whole with legitimation.9 These three contributions 
of education systems are the key means through which it is associated with the 
continuing expansion of capital.  
 
The key point here, of course, is that this fixity has typically been achieved at a 
nation-state level. However, it is also the case that while capital needs points of fixity, 
it is also driven by its own logic to minimize them and the obstacles they constitute to 
free trade. This is especially important in the present stage of globalization where 
motion above all takes the form of free trade whose logic is to remove any barriers to 
its further expansion. And this is also the case with state education, which is the most 
national of institutions and charged with embedding and defining at the level of the 
social formation rather than of the mode of production more narrowly conceived, 
ideas like  national identity, democracy, and citizenship—none of which is in any 
direct way crucial to the continued accumulation and expansion of capital but which 
indirectly stabilize and regularize capitalist regimes of accumulation. In sum, we are 
arguing that the logic of capital in an era of globalization takes the from of increased 
pressure of motion on fixity, or the forces of economic change on the institutions of 
political stability.  
 
Globalisation and Scale  
A key direction taken by the pressure of motion involves a second concept we want to 
introduce; the notion of scale.10 Broadly, scale refers to nested layerings of territories, 
for example territories we might call local, sub-regional, national, supra-regional, or 
global levels. 11 A key feature of scale argues Erik Swyngedouw is that a scale is 
neither ontologically-given   and nor is it, a-priori, a definable feature of geographic 
territories. Rather, scale is constructed with particular activities taking place on 
different scales and where one of those scales might be dominant over others, as in the 
post-war two period and the national scale. Harvey calls this a scalar fix; a particular 
configuration of various overlapping forms of territorial organisation that  includes all 
circuits of capital and multiple entwined geographical scales.12  The scales are fixed 
through social processes, such as legal codes, monetary regimes, networks, state 
regulatory institutions, and so on. 
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While scales appear fixed, over the medium term and long haul we can see that they 
are fluid and dynamic; they are produced, contested and transformed through a range 
of socio-political and discursive processes, strategies and struggles over what that 
social space contains. 13 Struggles take place at different scales engaging an array of 
actors and interests; for example, capital, national states, para-state organizations, 
labour unions, local social movements, supra-national organizations. Summarizing 
these debates, Brenner notes that scale  
1. is methodologically important as a spatio-temporal unit of analysis;   
2. involves a critical dimension in the unfolding wave of global capitalist 
restructuring – referred to as re-scaling; 
3. is a key strategy of social and political transformation;  




The third concept attempts to grasp hold of the idea of struggles over space and scale 
–referred to by Harvey as territorialisation. 15 This is the strategic action taken by 
social actors over space in an effort to command and govern space.  The development 
of both cities and territorial states are examples for Brenner of territorialisation;  for 
example, is a good example of teritorialisation; the result of imperial powers seeking 
to lay claim to territories, their resources and subjects.   In the same way esulting in 
pressure to disembed existing social arrangements and embed new ones at existing 
and different scales.16  In Brenner’s words: “The central hypothesis that emerges from 
these considerations is that the tension between fixity and motion in the circulation of 
capital has periodically triggered major transformations in the scalar organization of 
the territorial state.”17   
 
Shifts in scale and processes of reterritorialisation,  in response to crisis and crisis 
displacement, are recognizable at the current time as strategies such as devolution, 
centralization, regionalization, decentralization, internationalization and so on.  In 
drawing these ideas together, we can argue that shifting scales involves the active 
construction and reconstruction of territories for the purposes of governing. In 
particular, issues that appear fundamental at one scale disappear entirely from view at 
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another; factions that are active participants at one scale can fade from the scene or 
even change at another.18  
 
 
Space, Scale and the Governance of Education 
A crucial part of our argument is that these three processes, of fixity and motion, scale 
and processes of territorialization are important analytical windows through which to 
view the changing governance of education.  Bringing these, we argue, moves us 
toward a more nuanced understanding of the relationship between globalization and 
education. The way that we will develop this part of the argument will be based 
around the work of Bob Jessop and his analysis of the dominant regime in the post 
war two period in advanced capitalist societies; the Keynesian Welfare National State 
(KWNS).19  
 
Jessop argues that following on from the world crisis in the 1970s, a series of 
rescaling efforts have been underway in these societies as a means of managing the 
crisis. The outcome has been, according to Jessop, the emergence of a new type 
institutional fix—the Schumpeterian Workfare Post-National Regime (SWPNR). In 
other words, what has been disembedded are the institutional arrangements and social 
relations of the post-war period which secured full employment through a relatively 
closed national economy and demand-side management and economic and social 
rights which were, in turn, attached to citizenship of a national territorial state. 
Education provision within this settlement was a major social policy item largely, but 
not exclusively, funded and provided by the state where conditions of universal access 
were linked to a right of citizenship. These regimes were primarily national in that 
economic and social policy was pursued within a national matrix—a national state, a 
national economy, a society of national citizens, a national system of education, and 
so on.  They were also statist in that state institutions—operating at a number of 
hierarchical scales—augmented market forces to secure, on the one hand, economic 
growth and  on the other social cohesion through a notion of citizenship as a form of 
social contract.    
 
 While the first two components of Jessop’s typology— the idea of Keynesianism and 
especially the second, welfare—have been recognized in a number of contributions in 
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education, the notion of the National State and Postnational Regime’ elements have 
had considerably less airing. These two elements are particularly significant to the 
argument of this paper in that they usefully enable us to capture the consequences for 
education of the combination of the changing relations between fixity and motion  and 
rescaling. The consequences of this shift from the National State to the Postnational 
Regime in education are represented in Fig: 1 where the shift from National to 
Postnational is reflected in the change in scale of governance of education—from 
national to either, or both, supranational and sub-national, and where the shift from 
State to Regime is reflected in the changes in the configurations of coordination of 
educational governance; from assumed state monopoly over all aspects to a 
bewildering range of possibilities in which regulation seems to be the only necessary 
element of state monopoly, though we suggest that even that cannot be assumed.     
 
Insert Fig:  1. about here.  
 
Finally, we need to note that the strategy adopted by the KWNS was essentially, albeit 
in different ways and to different degrees, one of decommodification, driven basically 
by the state’s need to supply public goods. This had two consequences. On the one 
hand, as has been widely recognized, it entailed the state raising taxes—from capital 
as well as from citizens—to pay for the decommodified services. On the other, 
decommodified services are by definition not trade-able. When, as in the case of 
education, they represent an enormous expenditure, the pressure of capital is to make 
them subject to the rules of the market and free trade.  
 
Pressure for the increased commodification of education is one consequence of a 
globalizing competitive economy where states can no longer act as if national 
economies are closed and their growth dynamics are predominantly domestic. In 
response, advanced economies have sought to develop a competitive advantage 
through the development of what are widely referred to as knowledge-driven 
economies.  “Its growth dynamic depends on how effectively a given economic 
space—not necessarily a national economy—is inserted into the changing global 
division of labour.”20  New economic spaces can be seen with the rapid growth in the 
non-governmental services sector globally, representing over 60 per cent of GDP in 
the industrialized countries and 50 per cent in developing countries. By 1997, global 
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trade in services amounted to US$1.295 trillion—around 25 per cent of the overall 
figure for global trade in commodities.21  For some observers, given that services 
account for almost two-thirds of the economic activity in industrialized economies, it 
was not surprising that this would eventually be regarded as an area to be opened to 
the world market. Indeed, there had been considerable pressure on areas such as 
financial services, telecommunications, transport, education and health, with a view to 
expanding their horizons of operation beyond the borders of the national territory.22 
 
Throughout this period the education sector from compulsory to higher education and 
training has been the target of restructuring. Given its role in the reproduction of labor 
power and in structuring national identity. Further, education has also been viewed as 
a potentially lucrative service, from compulsory schooling to higher education, which 
can be sold in the global marketplace. For example, by the early 1990s, the export of 
education services from New Zealand to Asia had risen to being a greater foreign 
exchange earner than the wine industry.23 By 1996, the United States provided exports 
of education and training services that reached $8.2 billion, and had a trade surplus in 
education services of $7 billion.24  Education, in other words, was fast becoming 
viewed as an area that might yield substantial profits in the global economy. 
However, disembedding the post-war institutional fix with its particular governance 
arrangements,  and setting into motion the forces of capital accumulation in the form  
of the knowledge-driven economy, involves  old and new economic and political 
actors engaged  in a process of rescaling and territorialization.  It is precisely this 
process that we now want to detail in the study of a particular case of globalization; 
the rise of the WTO promoted by powerful national states and capital, and the attempt 
to rearticulate the nature and form of education  and its governance through the GATS 
to make education systems and education provision within nation states more 
amenable to a global accumulation strategy. 
 
 
The WTO and GATS – Global Actors, Global Strategies  
In the post-war period, the task of monitoring and regulating international trade was 
undertaken by a permanent negotiating forum; the General Agreement on Tariffs and 
Trade (GATT).  Under this Agreement, member states had the status of contracting 
parties. The role of the GATT was to be a forum for negotiations and to lay down the 
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rules of conduct for international trade. It was regarded, however, as a weak 
organization institutionally, with optional codes and a non-binding dispute settlement 
mechanism.25  
 
In 1995, the GATT was replaced by the WTO, an international organization of now 
over 140 members. In contrast to the GATT, the new WTO had a much stronger 
capacity to enforce rules in that countries must sign up in a Single Undertaking, and 
where the WTO regulates non-tariff barriers as part of that single undertaking. The 
WTO is the only international or global body mandated to establish binding rules 
governing trade between member countries and which extends (and is currently being 
extended) into many areas of domestic legislation.  
 
Specifically, the WTO became responsible for the implementation of the ‘tripod’ of 
agreements reached during the Uruguay Round in 1994—the GATT, the GATS and 
Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS). In this respect, the 
WTO agreements play a central role in constituting the basic regulatory framework 
for international trade and the development of trade policies.  Collectively, these 
Agreements have three main objectives:  
1. promoting trade liberalization where possible, 
2. progressively increasing liberalization through negotiations, and 
3. establishing mechanisms for dispute settlement. 
 
What was remarkable about the Uruguay Round was that for the first time 
investments and services and copyrights were to be regarded as commodities. Initiated 
in the first instance by the U.S. at the Uruguay Round, the GATT was expanded to 
become the GATS and potentially be the first multilateral, legally enforceable set of 
rules to be concluded on trade in services as a whole, from cross border as well as all 
possible means of supplying a service including establishing a commercial presence 
in the export market. The GATS sets out a work program normally referred to as the 
built-in agenda. According to Article XIX, WTO members “…shall enter into 




The two basic principles of the GATT were preserved and adapted in the GATS. The 
first principle, most favored nation, requires any GATS member country which grants 
most favored nation treatment to another country over imports and exports to grant 
the same treatment to all GATS signatories. The second principle, national treatment, 
states that foreign companies who are present in the market of a given country must 
benefit from treatment at least as favorable as the national companies operating in the 
same market.  
 
The GATS has three levels; (1) the main text, displayed on the WTO website, contains 
general principles and obligations; (2) annexes which deal with rules for specific sectors, and 
(3) individual countries’ specific commitments to provide access to their markets. GATS also 
has a fourth element; these are lists showing where specific countries are temporarily not 
applying the most-favored national principle of non-discrimination as well as temporary 
withdrawals from most-favored nation treatment.  However, while many service areas are not 
complete because of continuing negotiations and thus exemptions, governments are non-the-
less committed to phasing in these commitments within ten years. Indeed, all exemptions 
should not exceed a period of ten years and are subject to periodic review by the Council for 
Trade in Services or renegotiation every five years.  It should also be pointed out that so far 
there have been few commitments in the area of primary and secondary schooling, though 
countries are under considerable pressure to commit these, partly as once in, withdrawal is 
difficult. According to Woods and Narlikar, this type of agreement makes the process of 
liberalization almost irreversible: 
 
…the WTO was created on an all or nothing basis whereby countries had to 
commit to full membership in a ‘Single Undertaking’, binding themselves to a 
rule-based system, not just for the short term periods of loans or negotiations 
as is the case of the Fund or Bank conditionality. Withdrawal from any WTO 
commitment is extremely difficult, a temporary withdrawal requiring an 
appeal for a waiver to the organization. 26   
 
Where a country violates a rule, the WTO can legitimately retaliate against that member 
unless all consensually agree to veto a decision of the Disputes Settlement Body.   
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These developments in the governance of economic activity in a national territory, 
increasingly by international economic institutions, in particular the WTO, the IMF and the 
World Bank, now address issues which were previously dealt with at the level of national 
governments; that is “…decisions and policies taken at the international level are increasingly 
affecting groups and people within states.”27 Not all WTO member countries have been 
enthusiastic about lifting restrictions on foreign investment and market access, particularly 
developing countries who may not have a competitive advantage in these areas. On the other 
hand, economies such as Canada, the United States, Australia and New Zealand have sought, 
through their economic policies, to promote the services sector largely as the rules of the 
game in relation to services are made also to work in their favor. 28 
 
That the decisions favor some countries more than others is a consequence of the way in 
which the agendas that emerge are the result of political struggles over the rules of the game 
and how they work. While the governing process of the WTO is directly representative of 
member states because decision-making at all levels is member-driven and because all states 
enjoy an equal vote.  As a result, the Czech Republic, the United States, Hungary and Canada 
all have the same value vote.  However, in the WTO, the decision-making process occurs 
through consensus and this process generally takes the form of informal meetings in what are 
referred to as the Green Room process.29 Meetings are dominated by four countries—the 
Quad—made up of the U.S., the European Union (E.U.), Japan and Canada. These countries 
all have large market shares in the services area and enjoy significant input and influence 
over WTO decisions—not least because they can afford to staff a permanent presence in the 
WTO headquarters in Geneva enabling attendance at more than 1200 informal and formal 
meetings a year and because they are deemed to have an interest in the issues under 
discussion. 30  Their influence is bolstered by active presence of interest group coalitions who 
can promote the economic interests of particular fractions of capital. Not being a member, not 
being deemed to have a vital interest even if a member, not being able to afford a presence in 
meetings even if they are a member, and not having the resources to keep abreast of matters 
under negotiation to be able to develop a more complex understanding of the issues and how 
they are emerging and being shaped, results in even further disadvantages for the least 
developed countries.  
Some nations and interest groups, including, until recently, the EU, have sought to slow the 
pace of implementation of the GATS in the face of pressure from the U.S. and representatives 
from the private sector. In the case of the GATS, for instance these representatives included 
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the US Coalition of Services Industries and British Invisibles.31The differential capacities to 
fix the rules of the game thus institutionalize particular economic and political interests on a 
new global scale.  As a result, the governance mechanisms deployed by the WTO results in 
an uneven process of transformation of state power across nations, and the conditions for 
uneven development within and across territories. 
 
 
GATS:  Scalar Shifts and Territorialisation in the Governance of Education 
How is education viewed as an activity by the WTO under the GATS?  We begin by 
noting that the definition of services covered by the GATS excludes services provided 
under government authority and without commercial purpose.32 However, in order to 
meet the criteria fully and be excluded from the scope of the application of GATS, the 
education system of a country in question must be completely financed and 
administered by the state and must have no commercial purposes. However  
 
…few—if any— education systems remain which fulfil these conditions, most 
if not all of them fall within the scope of application of the Agreement. In fact 
the vast majority of countries have mixed systems, in which the private sector 
plays a more or less significant role and competes with the public sector. 33     
 
Indeed, on closer scrutiny, the public-private test is inadequate in determining 
whether or not the Agreement applies. For instance, it is argued that any institution 
that requires the payment of fees, even in a public system, falls within the category of 
private commercial activity and is then covered by the GATS. There are few public 
education systems in the world that could argue the GATS did not apply to them. Not 
only that, but the direction of restructuring has been to pressure education systems to 
increase fees as a result of a shortfall in government expenditures on public education 
over the past two decades; others have sought to implement a system of fees in line 
with public choice theory—a line pushed strongly by the World Bank in the 1990s.34 
In these cases, education becomes a potentially private and therefore commercial 
activity rather than an exclusively public one, bringing it inside the ambit of a trade-
able service that could be subject to an request-offer process. This is not to suggest 
that as a result of this, a particular sector of a nation’s education system that meets the 
criteria for inclusion as a trade is then immediately open for trade. Rather if the 
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process of progressive liberalization continues, such sectors will be vulnerable to 
pressure to open them to trade over the next decade.   
 
Following on from the WTO/GATT principles outlined about, the GATS is applied to 
services in education in two ways. First, it provides a general framework of 
obligations that applies to all countries in the WTO. This framework stipulates that 
there should be no discrimination in favor of national providers, that is, the national 
treatment principle is invoked, and there should be no discrimination between other 
members of the agreement, in other words, the most favored nation principle.  
Second, it identifies the specific commitments of member countries, indicating on a 
sector-by-sector basis, the extent to which foreigners may supply services to a 
country. There are certain basic principles that all countries must follow, however, the 
extent to which some services, such as education, are fully open at present to free 
trade has been a matter of individual choice of nations—the so called voluntary 
bottom up strategy.35 Thus, while at present the GATS is, in part, a voluntary 
agreement that countries can decide through what are known officially as request-
offer negotiations over which service sectors they agree to cover under the GATS 
rules, the U.S. government and business organizations have placed high on the agenda 
for change in the new rounds for negotiation.  
 
That education is a huge potential income generating item, as measured by 
expenditure by states, is immediately apparent in the following crude figures on 
global public spending on education offered by Education International;36  that on the 
threshold of the 21st Century, it had topped one trillion dollars and “…represented the 
costs of over 50 million teachers, one billion pupils and students, and hundreds and 
thousands of educational establishments.”  It is therefore not surprising that education 
activity, as a potentially trade-able commodity in the global arena, should come into 
view. And, while much of the export market in education has until recently been 
centered upon the tertiary sector, the WTO has a more expansive view of what 
constitutes education services. In the background papers prepared by the WTO for 
ongoing negotiations, education services are viewed as falling into five main 
categories:  
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1. primary education – includes the normal notion of primary education and 
pre-school education services, but excludes child day-case services and 
adult literacy services;  
2. secondary education -  includes high school education, technical and 
vocational education and school-type services for handicapped  students; 
3. higher education – the teaching of practical skills in post-secondary, sub-
degree technical and vocation education institutions, and education 
services provided by universities, colleges and specialized professional 
schools; 
4. adult education -  all education services not in regular schools and 
university – but includes general and vocational programs, literacy 
programs, correspondence schools, and  
5. other educational services -  anything not mentioned except recreational 
matters.  
From this list, there are few sub-sectors within the overall ‘education sector’ that do 
not fall into the ambit of the GATS. To date 42 WTO members have made 
commitments for at least one education sub-sector, such as primary, secondary or 
higher education. Interesting this figure of 42 includes, as one Member, the European 
Community states—an interesting turn of events given the notion of subsidiarity that 
structures EU relations between the EC and member states. Further, among the 42 
members, 25 have includes commitments for at least four of the five education 
sectors.37   
 
In terms of the nature of the activity that is then legally protected under the GATS, 
there are four main categories of trade in education:  
1. cross-border supply -  includes any type of course that is provided through 
distance education or the internet, any type of testing service and education 
materials which can cross borders; 
2. consumption abroad -  involves the education of foreign students and is the 
most common form of trade in education services; 
3. commercial presence -  the actual presence of foreign investors in a host 
country. This would include foreign universities setting up courses or entire 
institutions in another country; 
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4. presence of natural persons -  the ability of people to move between countries 
to provide education services.  
 
At present education remains one of the sectors, along with the energy sector, where 
WTO members have been least inclined to schedule liberalization commitments—
though there is clearly considerable pressure by organizations such as the OECD 
being exerted to do so.  In a recent report tabled by the OECD, they note that most of 
the OECD countries (25 out of 30) have made commitments in educational services, 
but a significant number of developing countries have not made commitments. 
Among the non-OECD countries, China, Chinese Taipei and Thailand are the only 
countries that have made commitments among the main importers of educational 
services who send their students abroad most frequently. They go on to note that 
“…on the other hand there are some low-income countries such as the Kyrgyz 
Republic. Lesotho, Moldova and Sierra Leone that have made a high level of 
commitment, most likely suggests the OECD in order to attract foreign educational 
investments.”38  
 
In the following section we want to signal, broadly, the existing practices and social 
relations of education institutions that would now constitute barriers to trade and 
would be subject to change following the progressive liberalization process. 
Concerning cross-border supply, countries would be regarded as having barriers in 
place if they, for example, restricted the import of certain types of education 
materials, for example, creationism science as an teaching text, or where the use of 
national satellites for beaming educational activity was restricted to nationally-based 
firms or state activity. Countries, whether large or small, have sought to foster their 
own research and teaching materials, where possible. However this would be viewed 
as an inhibition of the cross-border supply of a service.  
 
Barriers concerning consumption abroad are those that restrict student mobility—that 
is the education of foreign students--abroad. It is here that the most visible tip of the 
education services market can be recognized. As noted earlier, the advanced 
economies—U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, France and Germany have all 
sought to educate foreign fee-paying students in publicly funded institutions where 
the student pays a significant if not a total portion of the costs of their education. This 
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is not restricted to tertiary education. Rather, such education activity might include 
primary, secondary, tertiary, specialist learning such as languages, or professional 
learning, such as teacher training, social work, engineering and so on.  Barriers that 
have been identified which restrict consumption abroad are problems to do with visas, 
the amount of currency able to be taken out of the country, the difficulties in attaining 
the translation of degree of equivalents, and unequal access to resources within the 
country of study. Griffin Cohen observes that the sensitive issues are not likely to be 
those associated with visas and the like. Rather, it will be the “…way in which the 
removal of these barriers to ‘consumption abroad’ is applied in distinct circumstances. 
For example, any country that highly subsidizes students may find a requirement to 
provide equal access to these resources to students from another country an 
intolerable strain on public finances. The result could be the elimination of public 
subsidies to all students.” 39 
 
Identified barriers to establishing a commercial presence include:  (1) the inability to 
be recognized as a degree-or certificate institution, for instance cannot get status from 
the state to be recognized as a university; (2) measures that limit direct investment by 
foreign providers, for example because of equity ceilings—hence some type of 
financial twinning is required); (3) national requirements on an institution in setting 
up an institution, including national advantages such as grants; (4) nationally or 
professionally controlled needs tests – controlling the supply of particular types  of 
labor and therefore its value—as in the case of medicine; (5) restrictions on foreign 
teachers—the WTO single out the case of  Greek teachers, or France and the 
regulation foreign professors; (6) the existence of  government monopolies—making 
it difficult to establish a commercial presence; and (7) high levels of government 
subsidization of local institutions—and which are not available to foreign providers.      
 
Finally, barriers related to the presence of natural persons refer to matters such as the 
different approval processes for national and foreign educational providers, 
difficulties in recognition of foreign educational credentials, and needing to obtain 
visas in order to study, teach or establish a firm in another country.  While some 
aspects of this agenda need to be examined further, for instance the difficulties some 
educators face, particularly those from developing countries who take up posts in 
wealthier ones, there are other issues at stake. This not only exposes former colonies 
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to a preference for academics from the former colonizing country but, as education 
becomes viewed as a private trade-able commodity, foreign providers may well want 
to import educators rather than using local educators.  
 
Two key potential outcomes for national states emerge if the barriers, as identified by 
the WTO under GATS, are to be removed in the area of education services.  The first 
of these is that, if a country to volunteer to commit themselves to the GATS rules in a 
particular education sector, this would require that foreign education service providers 
be guaranteed the right of access and operation, including the right to invest, to be 
given degree granting authority, to be eligible for government grants for their own, 
operations or for their students, or to send in their own labor.  This would pose 
significant pressure on a system that was publicly funded and at the very minimum 
profoundly affect the public nature of education. The important issue here, too, is that 
once settlement of various issues is codified in the GATS, any changes will need to be 
settled through the disputes process.   
 
Second, if barriers were to be eliminated in the area of the free trade of education 
services, the private sector would be in a position to undermine public delivery of 
education services through challenging government monopolies. Given that the GATS 
is about securing the conditions for creating and expanding private markets in the 
education services area, whenever governments operate in what is—or potentially 
could be—a market, their actions are barriers to the creation of private markets and 
therefore need to be controlled.  Included in the challenge to government monopolies 
is the notion that government funded institutions are given unfair advantages through 
either direct subsidies or cross-subsidization within an institution. These will either 
have to be removed, or applied to the private sector as a matter of equal and fair 
treatment. Either way, the pressure would be to encourage public institutions to 
behave more like commercial enterprises and to have profit making rather than other 
motives – such as the valuing and protection of some disciplinary areas of knowledge 
for their own unprofitable sake—as their primary objective. These brief elaborations 
of the implications of the GATS for education services highlight the complexity of 
globalization as a product or an outcome of complex processes of territorialization 
and re-scaling that are at work in relation to a country’s education activities.  
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So far we have argued that through the GATS, the conditions are being created for 
disembedding education activity from its fixed institutionalized location as a  
nationally-regulated redistributional and legitimatory decommodified public good, 
forcing it into motion and into the global marketplace to be fixed through processes of 
successive liberalization as part of the built-in GATS agenda. In essence, the WTO, 
through the GATS process, has the potential to establish a new set of global rules of 
the game for the governance of education within national territories, in the process 
transforming state’s power and therefore the processes of development within and 
across nation states.   
 
In the following and final section we examine  the likely consequences for national 
states and their territories of this process.  While this might be viewed as speculative, 
we argue, firstly, that—given the nature of the Agreement as a binding commitment—
such speculations are critical if we are to have an informed debate on this. Secondly, 
as indications of the likely outcomes of a process of liberalizing education and 
making it more open to global interests we can look at the effect on the society of the 
liberalization and globalization of education in countries like New Zealand, or the 
affect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on the Canadian and 
Mexican education systems.40  
  
 
Contradictions and Displacements in the Process of Rescaling 
The above arguments suggest significant potential implications that rescaling will 
have on the governance of education as well as its social, economic and political 
consequences for societies and individuals. In this section we are particularly 
concerned with the potential contradictions that  might emerge with rescaling and the 
possible effects on the politics of education. Given the crucial role that education 
plays in ensuring both the economic and the extra-economic conditions of the process 
of capital accumulation, rescaling the politics of education are of particularly 
important.   
 
A hypothetical world education system, free of barriers, might entail not only an 
internationalization of educational credentials or a possible globalization of 
knowledge production and consumption, but will affect central aspects that have been 
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largely under the control of nation-states in the KWNS regime.  The process of 
rescaling the governance of education to the global level, and specifically to the 
WTO, raises a number of crucial questions.  For instance, how might national human 
capital planning be altered if a national education system was now governed by the 
rules of GATS rather than a nationally-specific set of rules? Further, how might one 
of the post-war roles of education, to construct national identity, be nationally secured 
in a global educational market place? Finally, will nation-states continue to allocate a 
central role to education as the central institution to ensure social mobility and 
meritocracy?  
 
A key point we want to make is that the contradictions and displacements will not be 
homogeneous; rather they can differentiated along several dimensions; the result of 
differing capacities and interests of nation-states to both participate in the global 
agenda  and to influence its outcomes. One dimension is procedural, that is the mode 
of political and operating calculation. 41 The dimension is substantive, that is the 
social functions assigned to educational policy aspects of the politics of education. 42  
The potential displacements can also be differentiated by considering which of the 
core problems of the state –creating conditions for capital accumulation, providing a 
context for its reproduction and legitimating the capitalist mode of production—will 
be challenged  by the processes of rescaling and  global territorialiization. 43 A third 
possible dimension of difference lies in the capacity—or indeed an awareness—of the 
implications of particular decisions in the negotiation process, to control the nature of 
the effects caused by the process of rescaling. This capacity varies as a result of the 
differing economic and political power of nation-states. These are key questions 
whose answers will be no doubt shaped by the crucial changes that may occur under 
the GATS rules. An awareness of some of these questions is discernible in localized 
pockets of resistance in countries like Canada where similar processes have been 
underway as a result of NAFTA.44  Such concerns may well account for some of the 
hesitation around offering the sub-sectors although, as yet, there is considerable 
research to be done.  As we have already indicated, the process appears to be an 
uneven one among actors, partly a result of the substantial differences in the capacity 
of nation-states to set the rules of the game as there are differences in the influence 
capacity of private organizations over an institution like the WTO, and partly because 
of the differing strengths of the economies of the countries involved and the need to 
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attract in foreign investment—a point recognized in a recent set of papers released by 
the OECD.45  The consequences of the GATS, or what we might view as the effects of 
the mechanisms of globalization —can  be understood as the differing capacities of 
nation-states to deal with the new rules of the game in an inter-state system of 
decision making. 46 These three dimensions do not exhaust the possible implications 
of the process of displacement, but they are useful instruments to analyze the potential 
contradictions and tensions in the movement from the national to the global level of 
decision-making.  
 
Setting Rules for a World Without Rules: Constitutionalising the Neoliberal Agenda. 
A first possible consequence of rescaling upward can be observed in what Jessop 
identifies as a central contradiction in the neo-liberal doctrine; that is, the need to 
extend the scope of regulations in order to guarantee larger market access, and at the 
same time to avoid all the barriers to the free circulation of capital. 47 GATS rules are 
a clear example of the need to establish political rules that have a compulsory 
character for its members. Interestingly, these rules of the game have to be highly 
codified in order to be effective. So, too, do the modes of conflict resolution as found 
in the Dispute Settlement Body. A review of recent disputes in the WTO web site 
reveals that  the U.S. receives most of other countries complaints suggesting that the 
country that is the major player in promoting progressive liberalization through the 
WTO also has the capacity to disobey the rules that it has previously encouraged. 
Codification, however, reveals the rules and makes them evident and therefore makes  
them susceptible to critique around their construction or application. 
 
In the educational field, we might imagine those aspects of a free market that may be 
quickly encouraged in the process of negotiation of GATS, such as commercial 
presence or cross-border supply, and those that will be subject to more difficult 
bargaining as a result of their political sensitivity, such as the presence of natural 
persons, because they are more likely to have an effect, whether direct or indirect, on 
the immigration laws. On the other hand, the high level of rule codification in the 
WTO indicates a different mode of political procedure. While nation states might 
operate in a rather  more flexible regulative framework to leave scope for political 
decisions, such as creating higher education institutions, grant-system policy, 
sanctioning educational credentials and so on, the WTO procedures lie in the strict 
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accomplishment of rules leaving little margin for political flexibility.48 This may have 
a decisive impact on a nation state that has often used its education system to absorb 
the problems within its territory—such as social cohesion, legitimation, support for 
accumulation.  
 
Undermining the Role of Education for Social Cohesion – or a Permanent 
Educational Crisis? 
A second effect of rescaling may be located in the structural role of education systems 
as important institutions for social cohesion. These distortions may take place at 
several levels. On the one hand, because the WTO—unlike the European Union—has 
no social agenda, there are substantial aspects of the social function of education that, 
structurally, the WTO does not address. While the role of education as a means to 
distribute equality of opportunity may, indeed must if legitimation  is to be assured—
remain on national and local state’s education policy agendas, states will increasingly 
face the dilemma of not having the fiscal and regulatory resources to address these 
issues. The state’s capacity to deal with the failure of the trickle-down effect of 
markets as a mechanism to distribute wealth may disappear in the process of 
displacement of the powers over education to a global scale. Some emergency 
strategies to react to educational crises may simply not be possible within the 
WTO/GATS framework, given that it sets strict rules on the intervention capacity of 
the state. In addition, discursive resources about meritocracy may lose their rhetorical 
power in a global educational market place where the purchasing power of individuals 
becomes a legitimate means of acquiring a high quality education.  
 
Rescaling may also reduce the capacity of the national state to deal with one its core 
problems—its legitimation problems. While the audience for what counts as 
legitimation remains basically national, under GATS rules the national state may have 
more difficulties in generating discourses and practices to manage educational crises. 
It might be anticipated that a range of processes will emerge to deal with these 
problems. This might include recontextualisation—that is, an attempt to embed the 
process through transforming it, or rescaling to remove from view and therefore limit 
and manage struggles –as in the case of many of the devolution strategies of 
restructuring states. 49  However, neither recontextualisation nor rescaling will 
ultimately fully absorb the displacement of the legitimation burden unless the WTO 
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itself moves toward developing mechanisms to deal with these problems—like the 
E.U.  This is particularly the case at the current conjuncture, as Robinson argues, as: 
 
Even if the global financial system can be brought under regulation the 
mechanisms simply do not exist for absorption strategies, nor does the system 
provide the material basis for a project of legitimation. It is not clear in the 
new epoch how these new contradictions will be played out or to what extent 
we may expect a transnational state to acquire the capacity to resolve them.50   
 
Interestingly, the for-profit discourse of an organization like the WTO leaves little 
space for the development of discursive and political strategies to deal with the 
potential and inevitable contradictions and displacements of capital accumulation and 
thus problems of legitimation. To date the WTO has relied almost exclusively on the 
discourse of neo-liberalism and arguments about the trickle down effect However, as   
the WTO meeting in Seattle in 2000 showed, the WTO will require more in its 
regulatory armoury to absorb the evident problems that have emerged in unequal 
trading relations. In other words, in the context of a growing world-watching civil 
society, the WTO has until recently shown little internal capacity to deal with social 
and political conflict. Its reactive strategies are not at all sophisticated, as witnessed in 
tactics such as meetings in remote places like Qatar, or the use of crude slogans. 
Rather, these have become simple targets for the new global social movements. 
  
From Investment to Consumption - the Business of Education and theHuman Capital 
Problem. 
We have already suggested that under GATS education is regarded as a for-profit 
service. Although some of the implications of this change have been already referred 
to in this paper, a further crucial aspect remains still unexplored. If education becomes 
a key industry for the process of capital accumulation in the knowledge-based 
economy, this change transforms states by carrying a crucial shift in the economic 
functions assigned to educational systems under the KWNS regime. Supported by 
human capital theory, education has played a central role in the process of capital 
accumulation and economic development. That is, education has been understood as a 
key investment by states to improve labor productivity and economic growth. Indeed, 
the human capital paradigm has been given as the rationale for educational planning. 
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Although based on neo-classical economics, this paradigm has oriented educational 
policy making in national governments as well as in international organisations like 
the World Bank.51 Priorities and strategies concerning educational investment are 
established in national ministries and supranational organisations as a means for 
economic growth and for absorbing the problems of potential market failure.52   
 
However, if, the primary leit motiv of the rescaling and  territorialising processes for 
global capital is about market access, then it follows that by setting into motion and 
commodifying education, the GATS rules undermine the strategic and economic, as 
well as the social  functions of education in national systems. Through GATS, 
education becomes a goal rather than a means in the process of capital accumulation. 
Although the goals and the means of the economic functions of education are not 
necessarily mutually exclusive, those aspects that may guide the expansion of 
education in the search of consumers may contradict those that guide education as an 
area of strategic investment for economic development.  
 
Moreover, the attack on the state sovereignty may not only be seen as a shrinking 
process in the state’s ability to invest strategically in education; it can also affect the 
rationality of nation-states in considering education as another area of foreign capital 
attraction. In a highly competitive global market, attracting foreign educational capital 
may well become a means of solving a countries balance of payments problems and a 
strategy to deal with the fiscal deficit of the state Indeed this appears to be a reason, as 
we have noted earlier,  for  some countries signing all  of their education sectors on to 
all modes of education trade. Of course, these reasons may be more powerful in those 
countries which educational policy has been largely imposed by the Structural 
Adjustment Programs of the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). 
However, even in countries like the United Kingdom,  private investment in 
education—in the form of public private partnerships in the United Kingdom—may 
be may be an attractive source of financing educational services and a mean to either 
reduce the educational budget or in the case of E.U. countries meet the terms of  fiscal 
prudence and levels of expenditure in the public sector agreed to under the E.U. 
Stability Pact (1992).  
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The Localisation of Globalisms: the Emergence of New Forms of Cultural 
Imperialism. 
The last possible consequence of rescaling to be considered here is concerned with the 
possible cultural implications of GATS on nations education systems.53 The scope of 
these effects may be diverse and not able to be predicted but would include all 
possible forms of cultural imposition, for example US texts on science, cultural 
hybridization as a result of global education channels such as Channel One, or the 
process of production and circulation of cultural commodities. Analyzing these 
possible effects is beyond the objectives of this paper, however we can point to the 
likely consequences for nations of cultural functions assigned to educational 
institutions by postwar nation-states—many of which will have a public good 
function. These functions include the building of national identity, the use and 
development of national language, a certain national policy of knowledge production, 
and the production and reproduction of specific forms of cultural capital appropriated 
by the emerging new middle classes.  Whatever the form of the consequence, what is 
important to register is that because of the GATS constraints, nation states will lose a 
considerable capacity to direct these outcomes in ways that they might previously 
have done.  Language and national identity are vulnerable social functions in a global 
market place dominated by multinational educational corporations. Indeed, the basis 
of a national policy for knowledge production, its national appropriation54 and its 
distribution, may be eroded in a free market context of a knowledge-driven economy. 
Along with the importance of knowledge and information as key inputs for economic 
productivity and growth, the struggle over its production, appropriation and 
dissemination becomes a critical aspect for the structuring of the unequal global social 
structure.  
 
Finally, even the role of schooling for cultural and social reproduction will face 
important challenges. Middle classes have historically tried to influence, participate 
in, or even appropriate some state institutions to ensure the basis of its social 
reproduction: the production and reproduction of cultural capital.55 Rescaling crucial 
aspects of the governance of education upward might potentially undermine the role 
of cultural capital in the reproduction of social structure while stressing the economic 
capacity of individuals to access to the top global higher education institutions. 
Mechanisms of social and cultural reproduction may be altered as a consequence of a 
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changing educational market that impacts on the patterns of educational aspirations 




In this analysis we set out to do a number of things. First, we wanted to move the 
analysis of globalization and education forward by introducing a series of concepts—
fixity and motion, space, scale and territorialization, that we believe give greater 
purchase on this complex process of change in the governance of education through 
the WTO/GATS process. Further, we argued that identifying key political and 
economic actors like the WTO as subjects of globalization, and examining the 
mechanisms through which they both exert power and respond to pressures, moves us 
away from the ideological appropriations of globalization. In essence, we wanted to 
use this as a window on complex processes at work to reveal real actors and interests .  
Examining  the politics of rescaling and the emergence of the WTO as a global actor,  
and the mechanisms like GATS through which it works on national territories and 
education systems, enables us to see how education systems are both offered, and 
pressured into responding to, the logic of free trade globally. We are also able to see 
processes of territorialization at work, particularly through the way in which particular 
countries have been very powerful in promoting liberalization in ways that suit their 
own interests.  We have argued that not only does the WTO become a site where 
powerful countries are able to dominate and shape the rules of the game, but in a 
global economy some countries increasingly view opening up their education systems 
to the global marketplace as a means of attracting foreign investment. At the same 
time we have tried to be careful not to suggest that the WTO is not simply an 
instrument of global capital, though this is surely this is part of the story. Rather we 
have sought to show that many states—though not all in the same way and not for the 
same reasons—are at least willing if not eager players in the WTO processes as they 
seek to advance their own national interests in global knowledge economy. Further, 
the process of rescaling aspects of the governance of education upward to the global 
level will, we believe, pose considerable problems in the short and medium terms for 
national states. That is, they will find it increasingly difficult to manage both the 
conditions that ensure the expansion of capitalism and the means to absorb its 
contradictions because their technical and political capacity will be curtained. 
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Diminished state autonomy—particularly in the provision and regulation of 
traditionally public goods without the possibility of constructing at the same time 
global political structures to account for market failures—may locate education at the 
forefront of national and global political battles. If this happens, the role of national 
education system in fixing,  albeit indirectly, the conditions for the expansion of 
global capitalism—in the face of no alternative—will be eroded. This will, surely, 
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